The following discussion is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section.
The RfC is closed as following;
Proposal 1 (Election Management): All subsections have support to pass.
Proposal 2 (Nomination of Directors): Proposal is passed.
Proposal 3 (Revocation of Directors): Proposal is passed.
Proposal 4 (Eligibility to Vote): Proposal is passed.
Proposal 5 (Length of Director Related Votes and Elections): Proposal is passed.
Proposal 6 (Length of Voting): Proposal is passed.
Proposal 7 (Director Eligibility): Proposal is passed.
Regarding the comments section, changes to the Attribution section will be implemented for sake of clarity. John (talk) 16:45, 2 December 2019 (UTC)
Following Incorporation, The community are able to conduct elections to nominate Community Appointed Directors. This RfC is to debate the proposed policy. You will be able to vote on each section and may if needed propose to amend various parts of the text. It is very important you express your opinion as the people appointed can have a massive impact.
Casting neutral for now. I appreciate the consideration that it is necessary to have a neutral and independent party managing community elections. Even better (and I hope to see this eventually) would be a committee setup instead of a team of commissioners. Additionally, I would like to see the Secretary involved with elections further than simply a recipient of information (i.e. a voting or advisory seat on such a commission/committee). dross (t • c • g) 01:10, 23 November 2019 (UTC)
We can have up to 3 commissioners, due to the fact the Secretary is a board member they won't be able to vote but I would advise the commission to treat them as an advisor rather than a recipient. ~ RhinosF1 - (chat)· acc· c - (WB) 15:57, 25 November 2019 (UTC)
@RhinosF1:I understand the desire to want to have a democratically-elected and responsive board, but there needs to be at least one anti-takeover measure. The Secretary should just be a regular commissioner if you ask me to help safeguard against hostile takeovers and such. –MJL‐Talk‐☖ 16:15, 25 November 2019 (UTC)
Stricken per comment from current secretary. –MJL‐Talk‐☖ 16:38, 25 November 2019 (UTC)
Oppose in favor of higher limits. I simply don't believe 3 will always be enough. dross (t • c • g) 01:10, 23 November 2019 (UTC)
The commission in future is welcome to adapt this via an RfC. ~ RhinosF1 - (chat)· acc· c - (WB) 15:57, 25 November 2019 (UTC)
Oppose I feel like the secretary of the board should be an ex-officio member of the commission just to ensure that there is always at least one person on it (rather than just arbitrarily mandating it). –MJL‐Talk‐☖ 16:10, 25 November 2019 (UTC)
Moving to neutral. –MJL‐Talk‐☖ 16:37, 25 November 2019 (UTC)
Oppose I agree up until the "60% vote" point, I think someone should be appointed only if that person is credible, Democracies have allowed the wrong people to be elected. I think this should be considered, however it should not be threated as a rule of thumb, if someone can provide evidence that person is bad, then said person shouldn't be elected. MarioSuperstar77 (talk) 00:45, 27 November 2019 (UTC)
Moving to support actually per comment from current secretary below. –MJL‐Talk‐☖ 16:40, 25 November 2019 (UTC)
Abstain I think we would like to have a higher support rate for this (75 or 80). 60% seems a bit too low to me. Other parts seem fine to me, however.--開拓者(The Pioneer) (talk/contribs | global🌎) 17:18, 26 November 2019 (UTC)
Support --DeeM28 (talk) 16:45, 25 November 2019 (UTC)
SupportPerhaps we would like to clarify how long the vote will be kept open in addition.--開拓者(The Pioneer) (talk/contribs | global🌎) 17:14, 26 November 2019 (UTC) Found out that it was written in the following section.--開拓者(The Pioneer) (talk/contribs | global🌎) 17:41, 26 November 2019 (UTC)
Supportdross (t • c • g) 16:17, 26 November 2019 (UTC)
Support, but what EK commented below is a good point; we should clarify how long the voting will be opened--開拓者(The Pioneer) (talk/contribs | global🌎) 17:29, 26 November 2019 (UTC) Found out that the length is defined in the following section.---開拓者(The Pioneer) (talk/contribs | global🌎) 17:40, 26 November 2019 (UTC)
Conditional support upon a precise and enforceable definition of "...clear, justifiable reason". dross (t • c • g) 01:10, 23 November 2019 (UTC)
A reason that is explained properly and backed up by facts. ~ RhinosF1 - (chat)· acc· c - (WB) 15:57, 25 November 2019 (UTC)
Far too much ambiguity. Leaves the revocation process wide open for witchhunts so long as the rationale appeals to whoever is administering the revocation process. Very worrisome to me. dross (t • c • g) 16:24, 25 November 2019 (UTC)
Strong oppose Needs an overhaul to make the practice enforceable. Absolutely cannot support in its current state. dross (t • c • g) 16:24, 25 November 2019 (UTC)
Dross Would you be able to provide some comments on what you'd support to create a directors revocation clause. ~ RhinosF1 - (chat)· acc· c - (WB) 16:45, 25 November 2019 (UTC)
Absolutely. I would first bring up the problems with the current phrasing. A clear reason will vary from person to person. Reason which might be associated with a unique relationship to a director in question should not be discounted simply because it cannot be readily understood by the collective. Following this, justification is also a very broad, subjective term. Without a clear-cut definition, an individual could discount a vote or input, simply because they don't believe the individual expressing said reason has provided ample justification. This power of subjectivity should not even be granted to community appointed elections commissioners.
As it comes to legitimate and enforceable definitions, certain criteria must be defined. As far as I can begin to propose, I would define the conditions for a clear reason to be one not obscured by propagandized content and in obvious good faith. Justification should follow the same guidelines as would ethical research and information. Claims not understood as common knowledge by a substantial amount of active community members should be backed by fact and supported by evidence. This is fairly brief and foundational, but hopefully it can provide some insight and maybe even (I hope) spark some discussion on the topic. Tl;dr: Requirements for valid rationale cannot be defined and reduced by single word descriptors. dross (t • c • g) 18:53, 25 November 2019 (UTC)
@Dross: Good point, but I also see you casting a support vote on #Proposal_1c:_Revocation, which defines the revocation criteria of the commissioners and uses the same "clear, justifiable reason" term. Could you tell us what made the different votes in detail?--開拓者(The Pioneer) (talk/contribs | global🌎) 17:27, 26 November 2019 (UTC)
@開拓者: Oh, somehow I didn't realize. An oversight on my part. dross (t • c • g) 22:15, 26 November 2019 (UTC)
Abstain I think we should clarify that a single person can vote with a single account, although it's a commonly established rule on wikis (otherwise those who have multiple accounts could vote multiple times).--開拓者(The Pioneer) (talk/contribs | global🌎) 17:59, 26 November 2019 (UTC)
Proposal 5: Length of director related votes & elections[edit | edit source]
Abstain Not enough information. What process/medium will be used to determine whether or not a candidate shows sufficient activity? dross (t • c • g) 21:31, 25 November 2019 (UTC)
Abstain The RfS and other RfP votes show that the community is already capable of choosing the right person, and I don't see the need to document this kind of regulation.--開拓者(The Pioneer) (talk/contribs | global🌎) 18:06, 26 November 2019 (UTC)
Dross I spoke to Owen about The Secretary being a commissioner and got the following: 'The Board Secretary views it outside of his remit and thus declines to be a member of the Commission' ~ RhinosF1 - (chat)· acc· c - (WB) 16:36, 25 November 2019 (UTC)
Hello everyone. While I think this process is a great idea, I do have some ways to improve it. For starters there must be a section for Eligibility to nominate. There are good rules in place for who can vote mainly to prevent sockpuppetry and meatpuppetry. However, in the means of preventing hat collecting or simply to prevent users from signing up for something they don't necessarily have a chance with, I propose setting the following requirements prior to nomination:
The user must have at minimum 60 global edits or log actions (I am open to changing the numbers a bit)
The user's global (SUL) account must be at least 6 months old (again open to higher/lower limits)
The user must not have any outstanding CoCC violations
The user must have demonstrated a reasonable amount of activity that is acceptable by the community
Also as for the appointment process, I propose that the voting must have been open for voting for at least one week's time and can be extended by a steward if needed. --EK ● contribs 19:56, 22 November 2019 (UTC)
Regarding, Eligibility to apply, you are welcome to draft a proposal for it.
Stewards based on the proposal, don't manage this election. The Commissioner will.
but I'm happy to add an amendment to allow a minimum vote length.
Can we get some clarification on the nomination rules? Do the support thresholds determine term length, or are the thresholds requirements based upon a candidates decision for term length? dross (t • c • g) 01:14, 23 November 2019 (UTC)
The rules on what percent and how many voters must vote set how long that term will last for you. ~ RhinosF1 - (chat)· acc· c - (WB) 15:57, 25 November 2019 (UTC)
So then... 80% support from ≥25 unique users = 2 years on board, and 75% support from 20-25 unique users = 1 year on board? Not "I would like to run for a 2 year seat, so I must get 80% support and ≥25 users". The question is whether or not candidates decide what term length they desire. There is a difference between a candidate stating "I want a 2 year/1 year seat" and "I would like to run for a seat on the board". The former indicates the candidate must meet the specified threshold to be appointed, whereas the latter indicates that the candidate is either
Appointed for one year
Appointed for two years
all dependent on whether the candidate got not enough support for a seat period, enough for one year, or enough for two years, respectively. Needs clarification. dross (t • c • g) 19:13, 25 November 2019 (UTC)
The way that the board carries out appointments is extremely bureaucratic and feels very cliquey at this point in time. It doesn't feel so much as they are serving to benefit the community as they are carrying out business in a secretive fashion which does not desire to involve the community. A community approved board member is all good and well until you consider that the community has no power of appointment, and it is simply advisory, lending itself to the consent of the existing board members. To make matters worse, the Secretary has clearly stated that he does not want to take part in the community elections process, leaving the community disempowered to take any action for the means of making change or influencing board decisions. Our voice as a community is limited by whatever the board allows us to speak on, assuming we even know about it. This community either needs some form of binding power, even if vested in a select committee instead of the whole, or the board needs to be transparent on all matters except those which pose legal, technical, or personal risk if disclosed publicly. I opt for the latter. dross (t • c • g) 19:13, 25 November 2019 (UTC)
Or hey, a different idea. Maybe appoint ombudsman/men with full access to information to ensure accountability and to be a direct representation of the community within the system. dross (t • c • g) 19:16, 25 November 2019 (UTC)
Hi, "The way that the board carries out appointments is extremely bureaucratic and feels very cliquey at this point in time." The way appointment occurs is as defined by the Articles of Association and under the Companies Act 2006. "the Secretary has clearly stated that he does not want to take part in the community elections process" I do not feel it is within my role as Secretary to have a leading and authoritative role in deciding whom the community elect to be representatives. When the recommendations come to the Board thusly, I would have a conflict of interest and be forced to recuse on a matter where I have no preceding interests. It is in the best interests of all if the process is independent and the community are empowered as much as possible to manage a process entirely disconnected from Board influence. If we wished to have an influence, we'd have decided on the process ourselves. I have stated I do not wish to take a leading part as such to limit the potential of influence from the Board, this point seems to contradict your initial point raised. "influencing board decisions" is a process done via community elected representatives, not through lobbying those who are there to add to the skills to further the project rather than gain through personal interests. "the board needs to be transparent on all matters except those which pose legal, technical, or personal risk if disclosed publicly" The Board is. There has not been any opportunity to be transparent yet as all that has happened is the transmission of private information to set up the organisation - this is a conclusion drawn pre-maturely which assumes bad faith in people who are here to impart their skills to further this project and not harm it. Owen (talk) 21:01, 25 November 2019 (UTC)
What private information regarding the establishment of the organization is so sensitive that it cannot be disclosed and the community cannot take part? Additionally, my entire point is that community advice is purely at the leisure of the sitting board. I am not familiar with the Companies Act, but I am doubtful that it prescribes new directors can only be appointed by the existing directors. I would like to promote the idea of a sovereign right to the community for the appointment of community directors. Frankly, incumbent directors should not even have the legal authority to deny community appointment (as they do in the current state of things) except in circumstances which would bring Miraheze Limited into noncompliance with law or in association with criminal activity. dross (t • c • g) 21:22, 25 November 2019 (UTC)
Information such as tax information is very sensitive. As well as our addresses too. The process has just been me collecting the relevant information - I'm unsure how much can be done in a public venue and then would be of public interest to do so in said venue. "I am doubtful that it prescribes new directors can only be appointed by the existing directors." It does - existing directors have sole legal responsibility for an organisation's operations, under law no one can appoint new directors except the existing directors or the Secretary of State for the United Kingdom. Owen (talk) 21:34, 25 November 2019 (UTC)
I think it will be better if you provide a link to the contributors' CentralAuth (or user page on meta/global user page on loginwiki) on Section 8 to make it clear all of them are users of Miraheze (as is already done in the EK version).--開拓者(The Pioneer) (talk/contribs | global🌎) 06:00, 27 November 2019 (UTC)
The above discussion is preserved as an archive. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section